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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the key 
international conventions in the field of intellectual property (IP).  It is the first 
international treaty that lays down the mandatory minimum standard of patent 
protection for nations across the world.  Given the comprehensive coverage of 
WTO membership,1 the TRIPS Agreement has effectively established an 
international standard for IP protection in member states.  With respect to 
copyright and patents, this Agreement expressly allows for compulsory licenses 
to be granted by competent authorities, with an aim to facilitate an adjusting 
mechanism to balance IP protection, on the one hand, and social or economic 
policy goals in general, on the other.2 
Specifically, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement authorizes WTO members 
to issue compulsory licenses on patents to address national emergencies, 
extreme urgency, or other socioeconomic issues arising at the domestic level, 
subject to the procedures and limitations stipulated in the same article.3  
Through Article 9.1, one of the incorporation clauses in the TRIPS Agreement, 
the compulsory license scheme as to the author’s translation and reproduction 
rights for developing countries, as provided in the Appendix of the Berne 
Convention (1971), essentially merges into and becomes an integral part of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  This involuntary license regime affords developing 
countries leeway to adapt the level of copyright protection to address local 
economic, social, or cultural needs.4 
In light of the important role that compulsory licensing could play in 
contemporary IP systems, the WTO reaffirms the members’ right to grant such 
licenses in the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted 
in November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference (Doha Declaration).5  
One of the main themes in the Doha Declaration is that patent protection should 
be implemented in a manner that permits WTO members to protect public 
 
1. As of November 25, 2013, the WTO has 159 members. 
2. See, e.g., CARLOS M CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 242–43 (2000); ANA 
MARIA PACÓN, What Will TRIPs Do for Developing Countries?, FROM GATT TO TRIPS—THE 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 339–40 (Friedrich-
Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 319 (2001). 
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, prem. & ¶ (a)–
(c), Apr. 15, 1994. 
4. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works app. art. I, ¶ (1), July 24, 
1971. 
5. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶ 5(b). 
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health and to promote access for the general public to essential medicines.  For 
that purpose, WTO members may use, to the full extent, the flexibilities as set 
forth in Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.6 
Following the guidance of the Doha Declaration, WTO members have 
made use of the compulsory license scheme to address their domestic issues, 
particularly in meeting the demands of public health.  For instance, Brazil,7 
India,8 Taiwan,9 and Thailand10 have issued compulsory licenses on 
pharmaceuticals essential for treating deadly diseases in recent years.  Even so, 
relative to the large number of patents now in effect for WTO members, the 
frequency and number of compulsory licenses to date have been low.11 
II.  CONDITIONS FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING TO BE EFFECTIVE 
The compulsory license does not exist in a vacuum.  Rather, the success of 
a compulsory licensing regime depends on the industrial and technological 
contexts that the licensee encounters.  For a compulsory license to be effective, 
a number of conditions must be present.  First of all, licensees with sufficient 
capacities are indispensable.12  The lack of technical sophistication and ability 
to learn has been a significant detriment to technological transfer in developing 
 
6. Id. at ¶ 4. 
7. Brazil issued a compulsory license against Merck & Co. for its HIV/AIDS drug, Efavirenz, 
in May 2007.  Riadh Quadir, Patent Stalemate? The WTO’s Essential Medicines Impasse Between 
Pharmas and Least Developed Countries, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 437, 459–60 (2009).  
8. On March 9, 2012, the Indian patent authority granted generics manufacturer Natco Pharma 
Ltd. the right to produce and sell Bayer’s Sorafenib, a patented medicine that is useful in treating liver 
and kidney cancers at an advanced stage.  Enrico Bonadio, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of 
Patents: The Bayer/Natco Case, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 719, 719 (2012). 
9. In the wake of the avian flu crisis, Tamiflu was considered an effective remedy for the H5N1 
virus. Failing to secure sufficient supply from F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., the Taiwanese Government 
granted a compulsory license on Tamiflu in December 2005.  See Kung-Chung Liu, Rationalising the 
Regime of Compulsory Patent Licensing by the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 757, 760 n.12 (2008); Eileen M. Kane, Achieving Clinical Equality in an 
Influenza Pandemic: Patent Realities, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137, 1167 (2009). 
10. Thailand granted a couple of compulsory licenses in 2006 and 2007, including the patented 
HIV/AIDS drugs Efavirenz (from Merck) and Kaletra (from Abbott), and Plavix, which is used for 
treating heart disease.  Kristen Osenga, Get The Balance Right!: Squaring Access with Patent 
Protection, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 309, 319–20 (2012). 
11. See Kung-Chung Liu, The Need and Justification for a General Competition-Oriented 
Compulsory Licensing Regime, 43 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 679, 681 (2012); 
Getachew Mengistie, The Patent System in Africa: Its Contribution and Potential in Stimulating 
Innovation, Technology Transfer and Fostering Science and Technology: Part 2, 16 INT’L TRADE L. 
& REG. 175, 178 (2010). 
12. Mengistie, supra note 11, at 178; Richard Li-dar Wang, 從 TRIPS 
協定與公眾健康爭議論專利強制授權之功能與侷限 [Functions and Restraints of Compulsory 
Licensing: Perspective from TRIPS Agreement and Public Health], 1 TECH. L. REV. 215, 235–36 
(2004) (Taiwan).  
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countries.13  Existing manufacturing capacity also matters with respect to the 
quantity and speed at which the compulsory licensee could put the patented 
technology or copyrighted work into production.  The more qualified capacity 
that is in place, the faster the licensed IP can come into mass production and 
fulfill the underlying goal of individual compulsory licenses—whether it is 
working the technology locally, treating a public health crisis, disseminating 
advanced knowledge and fostering higher education, or any other social or 
cultural need. 
Notably, the required capacity is not limited to those located within the 
issuing country.  If the scope of the compulsory license includes importation, 
the issuing government could utilize competent manufacturers located overseas 
to exploit the licensed IP and produce targeted products to fulfill domestic 
needs.  This practice is allowable under the TRIPS Agreement.  No provision 
in the same Agreement stipulates against non-voluntary import licenses.  The 
key is that the expected foreign supplier must have the right to produce in its 
own country, and be able to legitimately export the products at issue.  There are 
a couple of situations where those conditions will be met and it is entirely lawful 
to practice the subject matter and export the product there: when the term of the 
intellectual property protection covering the licensed subject matter has 
expired, or when no pertinent IP protection has been secured in the specific 
foreign country.  Supply from abroad may also be possible when a compulsory 
license is in place in the exporting country.  However, Article 31(f) of the 
TRIPS Agreement requires that each of the non-voluntary licenses be granted 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market, which does not prohibit 
the licensee from exporting the product so long as the exportation constitutes a 
minor portion of the total production.14 
Under the Guidance of the Doha Declaration, the WTO General Council 
established a waiver system in 2003 to soften the ban on production 
predominantly for exportation.15  Under the waiver system, compulsory 
licenses predominantly for exports are permitted, with the condition that the 
importing WTO member has no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, grants 
such a waiver, and notifies the WTO Secretariat.16  In December 2005, the 
General Council of the WTO formalized the waiver system, adding Article 
31bis to the TRIPS Agreement.17  This amendment is now waiting to take 
 
13. Mengistie, supra note 11, at 179. 
14. WATAL, supra note 2, at 325. 
15. Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health Decision, WT/L/540 and Corr.1 (Sept. 1, 2003), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm. 
16. Id. ¶ 2.(a). 
17. Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 
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effect.18  This waiver system, however, is limited to exporting pharmaceuticals 
to WTO members, and to date only Rwanda has filed one request for 
importation.19 
Historically, a number of governments have authorized importation of 
generic pharmaceuticals to address domestic health problems.20  For instance, 
the government of Ecuador granted a compulsory license in 2010 on Ritonavir, 
an antiretroviral drug, to the local distributor of Cipla, an Indian company 
producing a generic version of the same drug.21  Moreover, in the case of 
Efavirenz in Brazil, before local manufacturers could successfully provide this 
antiretroviral medicine, the Brazilian government included importation in the 
compulsory license and counted on several Indian generic producers to supply 
the medicine at a lower price.22 
The second critical condition is the size of the market, which is a decisive 
factor for the sales revenue that a licensee may reasonably anticipate from 
practicing the patent or copyright.  The potential magnitude of the market 
closely relates to whether the licensee would recover the necessary cost for 
employing the IP, benefit from economy of scale, or even make a profit.23  If 
the market size is narrowly restrained and only a very limited amount of 
revenue could be generated from the compulsory license, even manufacturers 
or publishers with adequate capacity to practice the patent or copyright may 
stay away from taking it. 
In calculating the size of a potential market for compulsory licenses, the 
basis for assessment in most cases would still be confined by the boundaries of 
the issuing country.  Foreign markets are highly uncertain. The patent status of 
 
2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm. 
18. As of now about 70 WTO members have issued notification that they accept this 
amendment.  Since less than two-thirds of the WTO members have formally accepted the amendment, 
Article 31bis has not yet taken effect and replaced the 2003 waiver.  The deadline for WTO members 
to accept this revision has been extended to December 31, 2013.  Decision of the General Council, 
Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – Third Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members 
of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/829 (Dec. 5, 2011). 
19. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under 
Paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/N/9/RWA/1 (July 19, 2007). 
20. See supra notes 7–10. 
21. Leaked Cables Show U.S. Tried, Failed to Organize Against Ecuador Compulsory 
Licensing, PUBLIC CITIZEN BLOG (May 10, 2011), http://www.citizen.org/leaked-cables-show-US-
tried-failed-to-organize-against-ecuador-compulsory-licensing. 
22. Keith Alcorn, Brazil Issues Compulsory License on Efavirenz, NAM (May 7, 2007), 
http://www.aidsmap.com/Brazil-issues-compulsory-license-on-efavirenz/page/1427206/. See 
generally Quadir, supra note 7 (explaining Brazil’s compulsory license on Efavirenz).  
23. Mengistie, supra note 11, at 178; Stacey B. Lee, Can Incentives to Generic Manufacturers 
Save the Doha Declaration’s Paragraph 6?, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1387, 1413 (2013); Wang, supra note 
11, at 236. 
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the targeted products in foreign countries determines whether they could be 
produced or imported freely in those countries, whether a compulsory license 
for importation will be imposed, and whether those countries would utilize the 
waiver system to lift the limitation of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement.  
Though there might be opportunities for the licensees to export part of their 
production to countries granting compulsory licenses on importation of the 
same products, the chances are quite uncertain, and it may seem remote for 
potential candidates that are considering whether to take the compulsory license 
or not.  As a result, countries that have only small populations or weak buying 
power will suffer from the constraint of market size,24 and the function of 
compulsory licenses would be seriously curtailed. 
A third precondition for an effective compulsory license concerns 
necessary know-how.25  The patent law surely requires public disclosure of the 
claimed technology to enable persons skilled in the art to carry out the invention 
themselves,26 but occasionally additional know-how is still necessary for them 
to put the claimed invention into industrial application on a commercial scale.  
IP licensing agreements, however, typically do not contain obligations 
regarding technical assistance or technology transfer from the IP owner. 
In the scenario of compulsory licensing, it is implausible to expect right-
holders to voluntarily provide any technical guidance to the licensee.  If the 
licensee does not possess all the skills that are critical for practicing the licensed 
IP—such as the know-how on commercialization, improving the 
manufacturing process, optimizing the yield rate, etc.27—she will still be unable 
to duplicate the product of the right-holder successfully.  When this situation 
arises, the compulsory license may not work as effectively as expected. 
III.  ANCILLARY ORDERS TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPULSORY 
LICENSING 
If countries fall short of the essential conditions as set forth above, 
necessary measures should be taken to make up for the deficiencies.  The first 
two conditions, however, are not so easy to restore.  If competent licensees do 
not exist, the government could only choose to step in and practice the patent 
or copyright with its own facilities.  Even so, the feasibility of this measure still 
 
24. See HANNAH E. KETTLER & CHRIS COLLINS, USING INNOVATIVE ACTION TO MEET 
GLOBAL HEALTH NEEDS THROUGH EXISTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES 12–39, available 
at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/word/study_papers/sp2b_kettler_study.doc. 
25. Mengistie, supra note 11, at 178; Wang, supra note 11, at 236–37. 
26. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 29, 
¶ 1 (“Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art . . . .”). 
27. Wang, supra note 11, at 237. 
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depends on the presence of production facilities and technical sophistication of 
the country with regard to the licensed IP.  Furthermore, factors affecting the 
magnitude of the market, such as population and national income, are difficult 
to change within a short period of time as well. 
A.  Know-How Transfer Orders 
The only condition that concerned authorities might be able to create in 
granting a compulsory license is the necessary know-how.  Those authorities 
could issue an ancillary order to require the right-holder to provide additional 
know-how to the licensees.28  In order to ensure the transfer of the licensed 
technologies, the order should obligate the right-holder to provide technical 
assistance, and hand over technical documents that contain the know-how or 
other technologies that the licensee identifies as necessary for implementing the 
compulsory license.  If the right-holder obeys the order and conveys 
undisclosed know-how, the receiving licensee is obligated to maintain its 
secrecy and pay reasonable royalties for using the know-how, just as a 
voluntary trade secret licensee would.29 
The licensee may encounter difficulties in identifying necessary know-how 
for transfers, but she does not have to recite the know-how item by item.  
Rather, the scope and content of the transfer order could be defined in 
categories with reasonable particularity, just as attorneys do in requesting 
opposing parties to produce documents or records in the discovery process of 
civil litigation in the United States.30  In case of doubt, the granting authority of 
the compulsory license should adjudicate the dispute through adequate 
procedures, and determine the proper scope and content of the transfer.  Where 
conflicts arise concerning whether the licensee has abused their rights in the 
know-how transfer and attained unreasonable advantages over the right-holder, 
the granting agency or a court should have the authority to decide whether the 
licensee is liable to pay compensation and refrain from further using a particular 
know-how. 
Since IP right-holders will undoubtedly tend to be reluctant to transfer 
undisclosed know-how, other sources of such transfers should be secured to 
facilitate the implementation of compulsory licenses.  For that purpose, the 
know-how transfer order could excuse persons that have access to the right-
 
28. Regrettably, the author has not found any national practice that adopts orders similar to 
what the paper proposes here. 
29. RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 7:3, § 17:16 (2013–
2014 ed. 2013). 
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A) (“The request [to produce any designated documents or 
electronically stored information] must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of 
items to be inspected . . . .”). 
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holder’s technical information or materials from their obligations under any 
existing non-disclosure agreement, thus enabling the licensee to get possession 
of necessary know-how.  To alleviate any possible adverse impact on a 
business’s honesty and integrity, this immunity could only be triggered at the 
time when the right-holder does not faithfully follow the transfer order and hand 
over all necessary technical information. The granting authority shall confirm 
that disobedience surely exists before issuing the transfer order through a 
formal adjudication process. 
Such an exemption to the non-disclosure obligation might seem vulnerable 
to distortion and abuse, which could be difficult to redress once the trade secret 
was revealed.  The primary function of the exemption, nevertheless, lies in 
deterrence.  It is an enforcement measure of last resort, which should be 
administered cautiously and conservatively. Countries should not solely rely on 
the non-disclosure exemption, but should rather establish other remedies, such 
as fines and injunctive relief, to enforce a know-how transfer order.  When 
those remedies fail and the exemption is granted, the competent authority 
should set up adequate rules and procedures to monitor the flow of trade secrets 
and prevent possible abuse.  If executed appropriately, immunity from any 
existing non-disclosure obligation could confidently be a useful enforcement 
measure against the right-holder’s resistance. 
B.  Goal-Attainment Ensuring Orders 
In addition to know-how transfer orders, there are still other types of 
ancillary orders that would help a compulsory license work effectively towards 
its contemplated goal.  For those non-voluntary licenses granted on the grounds 
of unavailability of affordable drugs to the public, the manufacturer 
undertaking the license should be directed to distribute those drugs at an 
affordable price, or even provide them for free to especially needy patients.31  
In the same vein, in the case of compulsory licenses on the basis of nonexistent 
or insufficient local working, the licensee should be required to manufacture 
the targeted products within the country and should be restricted from 
importing from overseas.32 
IV.  SIDE-EFFECTS PREVENTING ORDERS 
Besides ancillary orders that serve to ensure the effectiveness of 
compulsory licensing, there is another type of order that is purported to prevent 
 
31. In re Natco Pharma Ltd. and Bayer Corp., C.L.A. No. 1 of 2011, at 60–61 (Order item a & 
h) (Controller of Patents Mar. 9, 2012) (India), available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/
compulsory_license_12032012.pdf. 
32. Id. at 61 (Order item i). 
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adverse side effects to the right-holder.  For example, in the 2012 Bayer-Natco 
case in India,33 the targeted product Sorafenib was a drug for treatment during 
the advanced stages of kidney and liver cancer.  Bayer named it Nexavar and 
distributed it at a price of Rs.280428 (about US $5404) for one month’s 
therapy.34  Natco applied for compulsory licensing and proposed to sell the drug 
at one-thirtieth of the price.35  The Indian government approved the application 
and required Natco to refrain from both representing its production of Sorafenib 
as Bayer’s Nexavar drug, and from representing the two companies as 
associated in any aspect.36  Furthermore, Natco’s Sorafenib had to be visibly 
different from Bayer’s Nexavar in color, shape, trade name, and outside 
packaging.37 
Those mandates are quite similar to the special packaging and/or 
coloring/shaping requirements as stipulated in TRIPS Article 31bis.38 The 
common goals of ancillary orders are to prevent possible confusion of the 
licensee’s products with the right-holder’s and to inhibit the pharmaceuticals 
manufactured under the license from being diverted into the stream of 
commerce outside of the granting country. 
Another example of side-effect preventing orders can be found in the Berne 
Convention.  Article IV(3) of the Appendix of the Berne Convention requires 
that copyrighted works translated or reproduced under a compulsory license 
have to contain indications of the true author and the title of the work.39 This 
requirement protects the author’s moral rights, including the right of attribution 
and the right to the integrity of the work, from being impaired.  According to 
Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention, the author’s right of attribution and 
the right to integrity of the work shall be independent of the transfer of the 
author’s economic rights.40  Consequently, those rights should stay intact even 
when the author is facing compulsory licenses. 
 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 5–6; Bonadio, supra note 8, at 721. 
35. In re Natco Pharma Ltd. and Bayer Corp., at 6. 
36. Id. at 61 (Order item k). 
37. Id. at 61–62 (Order item k); see also Bonadio, supra note 8, at 726. 
38. Decisions of the General Council, supra note 14, at Annex, ¶ 2(b)(ii). 
39. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 3, at app. 
art. IV(3). 
40. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 4, art. 6bis, 
¶ (1). 
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V.  TRIPS-COMPATIBILITY OF ANCILLARY ORDERS 
A.  Know-How Transfer Orders 
The know-how transfer orders described above seem to be an ideal 
companion of compulsory licenses.  Whether the transfer orders are in 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, however, is somewhat problematic.  
Since there is no general exception in the TRIPS Agreement for all types of IP, 
a specific exception is necessary for exempting any derogation of IP protection 
from the level as required in the same Agreement.41  The first two paragraphs 
of Article 39 require WTO members to protect trade secrets, which cover 
undisclosed know-how.42  Meanwhile, the same article, and even the same 
section of the Agreement, contains no exception to the trade secret protection 
it demands.  This is not a coincidence.  National trade secret laws of WTO 
members usually provide few exceptions as well.  The United States’ Uniform 
Trade Secret Act, for example, contains just one exception.43 
The fact that no relevant exception to trade secret protection currently exists 
surely casts some doubts on WTO members adopting know-how transfer 
orders.  But there is another avenue for justifying such orders under the TRIPS 
Agreement.  In the first sentence of Article 39.1, the TRIPS Agreement 
articulates that the purpose of protecting trade secrets is to ensure “effective 
protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention (1967).”44 Article 10bis(2) of the Paris Convention defines the act 
of unfair competition as “[a]ny act of competition contrary to honest practices 
in industrial or commercial matters . . . .”45  The issuance of a compulsory 
license, which grants the licensee court-ordered authority to request the right-
holder to transfer know-how that is indispensible for fulfilling the license, 
should not in itself constitute an act of unfair competition contrary to business 
honesty.  Compulsory licensing is a well-recognized mechanism to introduce 
adequate exploitation of patents or copyright to achieve public interest in 
various socioeconomic aspects.46  The licensee here is just an undertaker of 
such a legitimate mechanism and does not come into competition with the right-
 
41. WATAL, supra note 2, at 309. 
42. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 39, 
¶ 1–2. 
43. U.T.S.A. §§ 3(a), 3 cmt. (amended 1985) (The exception excludes from compensation 
damages accruing after the trade secret has been revealed or otherwise no longer sustains an advantage 
over competitors.). 
44. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 39, 
¶ 1. 
45. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis, ¶ (2), July 14, 1967. 
46. World Trade Organization, supra note 5, ¶ 4 & 5(b). 
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holder for her own commercial interest.  As long as the compulsory license and 
ancillary order are based on national laws, granted legally by the authority 
concerned, and the licensee faithfully secures the secrecy of the know-how, 
there should be no offense to Article 10bis. 
Furthermore, laws and measures that compel disclosure of trade secrets 
usually do exist outside the trade secret law.  Mandatory disclosure is 
commonly seen in the fields of corporate auditing and marketing approval.47  In 
the TRIPS Agreement, Article 39.3 authorizes WTO members to require 
submission of undisclosed test data for the purpose of reviewing the marketing 
application of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products that utilize new 
chemical entities, on condition that such data shall be protected against unfair 
commercial use.48  The same disclosure requirement is present in the section of 
civil and administrative procedures and remedies of the TRIPS Agreement as 
well.49  In Article 43.1, the Agreement stipulates that national courts shall have 
the authority to order specific evidence, including confidential information, to 
be produced by one of the parties, subject to conditions that could ensure the 
protection of its secrecy.50  The two provisions comprise part of the treaty 
context that must be taken into consideration when interpreting the scope and 
content of trade secret protection mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.51  
Consequently, the fact that the trade secret law lacks any exceptions does not 
indicate that limitations on the trade secret right are prohibited.  As long as 
adequate measures are adopted to warrant its confidentiality, well-grounded 
disclosure orders from other areas of law should be reasonably recognized by 
analogy. 
The objective clause of the TRIPS Agreement further fortresses the same 
 
47. See e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669–670 (1984); Allen Ferrell, Measuring the Effects 
of Mandated Disclosure, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 369, 371–72 (2004); Trudo Lemmens & Candice 
Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to Health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials 
Transparency, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 63, 81–91 (2012); Liora Sukhatme, Note, Deterring 
Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug Approval Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213–
25 (2007). 
48. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 39, 
¶ 3. 
49. Id. at part 3, § 2. 
50. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 43, 
¶ 1 (“The judicial authorities shall have the authority, where a party has presented reasonably available 
evidence sufficient to support its claims and has specified evidence relevant to substantiation of its 
claims which lies in the control of the opposing party, to order that this evidence be produced by the 
opposing party, subject in appropriate cases to conditions which ensure the protection of confidential 
information.”). 
51. See infra text accompanying notes 39–40 (explaining the significance of treaty context in 
construing disputed treaty terms). 
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position.  In Article 7, the Agreement proclaims that the protection of IP rights 
should contribute to the transfer and dissemination of technology, “to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare.”52  Know-how transfer 
orders are purported to assist compulsory licensing to balance IP protection and 
the socioeconomic welfare of the public.  By requiring transfer of critical know-
how, those orders can ensure complete conveyance of all necessary 
technologies between IP right-holders and non-voluntary licensees, thus 
substantially enhancing the efficacy of technology dissemination that the 
compulsory licensing regime is aiming to achieve.  Taking all the above 
analyses into consideration, know-how transfer orders in effect could not be 
sensibly characterized as TRIPS-incompatible. 
B.  Local Manufacturing Orders 
Article 5A(2) and 5A(4) of the Paris Convention (1967) expressly 
recognize failure to work a patent and insufficient working as legitimate 
grounds for granting compulsory licenses.53  This is often regarded as a local 
working requirement imposed on patent owners.  In his famous treatise, 
Bodenhausen described the prevailing view of the word “working” in the 
context of the Paris Convention: 
Normally, working a patent will be understood to mean working it 
industrially, namely, by manufacture of the patented product, or 
industrial application of a patented process.  Thus, importation or sale 
of the patented article, or of the article manufactured by a patented 
process, will not normally be regarded as ‘working’ the patent.54 
In 1994, Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement further incorporated Article 5 
of the Paris Convention.55  WTO members would accordingly grant 
compulsory licenses for the reason of insufficient domestic working from 
patent owners.  In order to achieve the goal of local working, the granting 
countries might additionally grant an ancillary order that requires the licensees 
to manufacture the targeted products domestically and forbids importing.  
 
52. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art.7. 
53. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 45, art. 5, ¶ A(2) & 
A(4). 
54. G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 71 (1969), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/freepublications/en/intproperty/611/wipo_pub_611.pdf. 
55. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art.2, ¶ 
1. 
WANG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/26/2014  7:05 PM 
102 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:1 
 
These types of goal-attainment ensuring orders, however, may be incompatible 
with the non-discrimination principle as stipulated in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.56  This clause demands that patent rights shall be enjoyable without 
discrimination as to, inter alia, whether products are imported or domestically 
produced.  A WTO panel once ruled that Article 27.1 applies to Article 31 as 
well.57  It follows that the granting authority of compulsory licensing might not 
be able to treat patent owners and the licensees in a different way on the basis 
of whether the targeted products are imported or locally manufactured. 
The idea of non-discrimination and avoiding trade distortion is a 
cornerstone of the WTO.  The most-favored-nation principle and national 
treatment principle, two overarching doctrines throughout the WTO, vindicate 
and exemplify the importance of this basic policy.58  Article 27.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement crystallizes and enshrines the same idea in the field of patent law.59  
Even though failure to work and insufficient working are explicitly 
acknowledged as grounds for compulsory licensing in the TRIPS Agreement,60 
the meaning of the terms must be interpreted according to the whole context of 
the Agreement, including Article 27.1. 
Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) points out that when disputes arise, the 
provisions of WTO agreements will be clarified in accordance with customary 
interpretation rules of public international law.61  The WTO Appellate Body 
has consistently held that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT), as a rule of treaty interpretation, has attained the status of 
customary international law.62  Article 31.1 of the VCLT states, “A treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
 
56. Id. at art. 27, ¶ 1. 
57. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.91, 
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000). 
58. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 
3 (National Treatment) & art. 4 (Most Favored Nation); see, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT 
HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 28–30 (3d ed. 2005). 
59. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 57, ¶ 
7.94; See also Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM 
GATT TO TRIPS—THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 189–90 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996). 
60. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 2, ¶ 
1; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 45, art. 5, ¶ A(2) & A(4). 
61. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3, ¶ 2, 
Apr. 15, 1994. 
62. E.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, 10, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). 
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purpose.”63 
Even though the requirement of working a patent is understood as a 
mandate of local manufacturing in the context of the Paris Convention, it may 
slightly change its meaning when migrating into another treaty context.  As a 
transitive verb with an object, the ordinary meaning of the term “work” may 
include to “function,” to “cause to be in operation,”64 or “to fashion or create a 
useful or desired product by expending labor or exertion on.”65  The manner in 
which local working is proceeding, however, has not been specified.  In light 
of the non-discrimination principle as to the place of production, to “work” a 
patent could and should be construed more broadly as to “practice” a patent.  In 
this way, the local working requirement can avoid direct collision with the non-
discrimination principle and fit into the new context of the TRIPS Agreement 
much more adequately.66 
In the U.S.—Copyright Act panel report, a WTO panel held that when 
TRIPS provisions are incorporated from other international conventions, their 
original contexts in those external instruments could also be integrated into the 
Agreement as a basis of interpretation.67  The “acquis” thus introduced from 
other international instruments, however, constitutes only part of the context 
when interpreting those provisions.  The text of the TRIPS Agreement is 
undeniably another significant component of the context.  For the same reason, 
the panel in U.S.—Copyright Act panel report recognized that Article 13 of the 
TRIPS Agreement applies to provisions incorporated from the Berne 
Convention, though no analogous exception clause to the author’s public 
communication right is present in that Convention.68 
Professor Carlos Correa has argued that the non-discrimination requirement 
of TRIPS Article 27.1 is targeted at infringing products rather than the 
patentee’s products.69  He indicates that since the language of Article 27.1 only 
states that “patent rights [are] enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . 
 
63. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/v1155.pdf (emphasis 
added). 
64. OXFORD AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (2002), available at 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/work?q=work (last visited June 6, 2013). 
65. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1443 (11th ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/work (last visited June 6, 2013). 
66. See also Joseph Straus, supra note 59, at 205. 
67. See Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 6.92, 
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000). 
68. Id. ¶ 6.94. 
69. Carlos M. Correa, The Use of Compulsory Licenses in Latin America, in COMPULSORY 
LICENSING (Reto M. Hilty & Kung-Chung Liu eds., forthcoming 2014). 
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whether products are imported or locally produced,”70 the provision could be 
interpreted as mandating that inventors shall possess equivalent rights of 
patents against infringing products, whether those infringing products are 
produced domestically or imported from abroad.71  When the ordinary meaning 
of treaty language is vague, even in light of its context, the negotiating history 
could be instrumental in ascertaining its true intention.72  During the negotiation 
process of the TRIPS Agreement, the local working requirement aroused heated 
debates among developed and developing countries.73 The current language of 
Article 2.1 and 27.1 marks the compromise that the opposing parties eventually 
reached to resolve this deadlock when the negotiations concluded.74  If we 
consider for now that the non-discrimination requirement as to the place of 
production is for infringing products rather than the patentee’s products, the 
negotiating history will be neglected, and the intention of the drafter will be 
distorted.  Even though Professor Correa refers to the U.S.-Section 337 report 
of the GATT era75 to illustrate possible discrimination between infringing 
products from importation and local production, the measures at issue in the 
same case—border measures that in essence only target imported goods—have 
also been expressly recognized in the text of the TRIPS Agreement as 
legitimate remedies against IP infringement.76  It is thus unlikely for the 
agreement to institute a prohibition in Article 27.1 against such enforcement 
measures that are particularly authorized in the same instrument. 
According to the analysis above, in light of the non-discrimination principle 
in Article 27.1, the local working requirement should not be interpreted as a 
local manufacturing requirement.  Similarly, ancillary orders to secure local 
manufacturing on the side of the licensee may violate the same clause as well.  
When insufficient practicing of a specific patent is found, the non-voluntary 
licensee should be permitted to import, as well as to produce domestically, the 
targeted products to meet the local demand.77 
 
70. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 27, 
¶ 1. 
71. Correa, supra note 69. 
72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 39, art. 32 (providing for 
supplemental means of treaty interpretation, “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) 
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”). 
73. WATAL, supra note 2, at 317–18. 
74. Id. at 318. 
75. Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989). 
76. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, Part 
III, § 4 (Special Requirements Related to Border Measures). 
77. See generally Bonadio, supra note 7, at 723.  But see Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, 
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VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Compulsory licensing is a well-recognized regime that strikes a balance 
between patent and copyright protection and socioeconomic goals.  In order to 
make it work effectively, some ancillary measures are necessary.  When the 
licensee lacks access to critical know-how for practicing the licensed 
technology, the granting authority of the compulsory license may require the 
right-holder to transfer such know-how to fill the gap.  In addition, we might 
see the government authority require the licensee to manufacture the targeted 
product locally, or to provide the licensed medicine to the public at an 
affordable price, so as to ensure the compulsory licensing attains its 
contemplated goal. 
On the other hand, the granting authority can issue a side-effect averting 
order to alleviate unnecessary impact that compulsory licensing may impose on 
the right-holder, so that the license does not become too intrusive.  Those two 
types of ancillary orders are practical complements to non-voluntary licenses, 
and could be beneficial for the current regime of compulsory licensing, both 
nationally and internationally.  They are undoubtedly worthy of consideration 
to be incorporated into national laws and international conventions. 
The fact that no exception is expressly acknowledged in the trade secret 
section of the TRIPS Agreement casts some doubts on the legality of know-
how transfer orders.  These doubts are not well founded.  Outside of the trade 
secret section, the TRIPS Agreement contains at least two provisions 
demanding submission of undisclosed information.78  The objective clause of 
Article 7 also suggests against incompatibility of those orders with the TRIPS 
Agreement.79  On the other hand, orders requiring local manufacturing are 
likely to contravene the TRIPS Agreement by violating the non-discrimination 
principle between imports and local production in Article 27.1.  Even though 
the TRIPS Agreement expressly incorporates the local working requirement of 
patent owners from the Paris Convention, the meaning of “working” should be 
adjusted properly to reflect the change of treaty context, and is reasonably 
construed in this Agreement to encompass importation to avoid direct conflict 
with Article 27.1. 
 
 
Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local 
Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275, 313 (2010) (the differential treatment resulting from 
local working requirements does not amount to an unjustified disadvantage, and hence is not a 
discrimination under Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
78. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 39, 
¶1 & art. 43, ¶ 1. 
79. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 7. 
